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Abstract
We examine in controlled experiments how individuals make choices when faced with
multiple options. The choice tasks mimic the selection of health insurance, prescription
drug, or retirement savings plans. However, in our experiment, the available options can
be objectively ranked. We ¯nd that the probability of a person selecting the optimal
option declines as the number of options increases, with the decline more pronounced
for older subjects. Heuristics seem to di®er by age with older subjects relying more
on suboptimal decision rules. Behavior consistent with the estimated decision rules is
observed in an out-of-sample experiment.
JEL classi¯cation: C91, DO3, I18
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Aging grant R21AG030184.\Having the opportunity to choose is no blessing
if we feel we do not have the wherewithal to choose wisely."
| Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice
1 Introduction
Individuals selecting retirement savings or medical insurance plans face a profusion of choice.
This often leads to the selection of seemingly suboptimal plans (Iyengar and Kamenica 2008,
Kling et al. 2008). Our objective is to better understand how individuals make complex
decisions, why they sometimes make bad ones, and how these are a®ected by the nature of the
choice task. We do so experimentally by having subjects select from choice sets with varying
numbers of options. Under standard economic assumptions about behavior, a decision maker
can never be worse o® when provided with more alternatives. This rests on the formalism
that the supremum of any function on some set X is never less than the supremum on some
subset Y contained in X. However, behavioral research suggests that individuals may be
averse to choice. Faced with many options, they postpone making a decision and are likely
to be unhappy with their choices.
Iyengar and Lepper (2000) show that consumers encountering a large assortment of jams
or chocolates were less likely to make a purchase or express satisfaction with their choice
than consumers presented with a smaller assortment. Similar patterns have been identi¯ed
in more consequential decisions. Physicians o®ered a greater choice of drugs to prescribe are
less likely to prescribe any drug (Redelmeier and Sha¯r 1995, Roswarski and Murray 2006).
Enrollment in workplace retirement savings plans is sensitive to the information provided
(Du°o and Saez 2003), the presence of default options (Carroll, et al. 2008), and decreases
with the number of choices (Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman 2004, Agnew and Szykman 2005).
The recent introduction of prescription drug coverage into Medicare, known as Medicare
Part D, provides another example. As the new Medicare bene¯t was being rolled out, reports
in the popular press suggested seniors were \overwhelmed" by the 40 or more options pre-
sented to them. In one survey, very few seniors found this profusion of choice helpful, while
73% thought it would make it \di±cult and confusing" (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006).
Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2007) report that most of the 4.6 million Medicare recipients
without prescription drug coverage would bene¯t from enrolling. Frank and Newhouse (2007)
argue the complexity of Medicare Part D plans has discouraged enrollment and likely resulted
in suboptimal choices.
1Most previous research on decision making in these settings has focused on whether a
decision was made and one's self-reported satisfaction with the decision. Our paper departs
from current research by objectively measuring the optimality of subjects' decisions and by
estimating the rules individuals use when making a choice. Several ¯eld experiments have
attempted to estimate optimal choices from actuarial or survey methods (Heiss, McFadden,
and Winter 2007, Winter et al. 2006). These approaches tend to be limited in their inability
to de¯ne the full choice set or to quantify the value of each alternative for speci¯c consumers.
Schram and Sonnemans (2008) explore experimentally the e®ect of complexity on choice
in selecting stylized health-care plans with costly information acquisition. They ¯nd the
quality of decisions decreases in more complex choice sets, as does the amount of information
subjects elected to consider. However, the ranking of options depended on each subject's risk
preferences, a confounding factor absent from our design.
We provide subjects with a series of multi-attribute choice tasks where one option is
objectively optimal. In particular, the ranking of options does not depend on subjects' risk
preferences, and requires only that subjects prefer more money to less. The full choice set is
clearly de¯ned, as is the value of each option to each subject. While a correct choice always
exists, its identity is concealed from subjects by manipulating both the number of attributes
of each option and the number of options.
Unlike most economics experiments, our subject pool includes individuals ranging in age
from 18 to over 80. While the e®ect of sex on decision making in economics experiments
has received considerable attention (Croson and Gneezy 2008, Eckel and Grossman 2008,
Cox and Deck 2006), the e®ect of age has been much less studied. One notable exception
is Kovalchik et al. (2005) who ¯nd little di®erence between older and younger subjects in a
variety of experimental tasks. In contrast, we ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences, and later discuss
this apparent disparity. Our design allows for both analysis of the frequency of optimal choice
and estimation of the decision rules used by di®erent age groups.
Despite the economic importance of the decisions, individuals often use suboptimal deci-
sion rules when selecting among 401(k) plans. Common strategies include allocating equally
among all choices (Benartzi and Thaler 2002, Huberman and Jiang 2006) or selecting the
safest, low-yielding money-market funds (Iyengar and Kamenica 2008). Given limits on the
brain's ability to retain and process information (Miller 1956 and Cowan 2001), the use of
2simple choice-making strategies, or heuristics, simpli¯es the decision. However, the cognitive
powers of the human brain are not constant through life as cognitive function and working
memory decline with age.1 With age, individuals experience lower recall (Gilchrist, Cowan,
and Naveh-Benjamin 2008), reduced ability to make connections (Mitchell et al. 2000), less
task focus (Isella et al. 2008), and slower information processing (Cerella 1985). Perhaps
as a result, older individuals appear to face greater di±culties with decisions (Frank 2004,
Hanoch and Rice 2006, Hibbard et al. 2001) and are more prone to decision errors (Finucane
et al. 2002). These factors lead to signi¯cant adjustments in decision-making heuristics. For
instance, older individuals examine less information and consider fewer options when making
choices (Cole and Balasubramanian 1993, Johnson 1993, Zwahr, Park, and Shifren 1999).
If older and younger individuals approach decisions di®erently, this could have important
policy implications. Can young adults be expected to make optimal retirement planning
choices when presented with a variety of 401(k) investment options? Can older individuals
be expected to make good choices when selecting medical or prescription drug insurance
plans? Both decisions have signi¯cant economic impacts, as total assets in 401(k) plans
exceeds $1.8 trillion (EBRI 2005) and one of every twenty dollars in the United States is
spent on health care for those over 65 years of age (Liu, Rettenmaier, and Wang 2007).
In our experiments, subjects make optimal choices 40% of the time across all choice tasks,
with older subjects making more decision errors than younger participants. Graduate degree
holders make fewer decision errors. Other levels of education do not appear to be signi¯cant,
and decision errors do not vary with sex. We ¯nd that increasing the number of options
decreases the frequency of optimal choice. This e®ect is much larger for older subjects. Age
has a second-order e®ect as well, with older subjects experiencing a greater increase in decision
errors than younger subjects as the number of options increases.
We examine two possible explanations for the age e®ect. First, a higher stakes exper-
iment replicates our initial ¯ndings, suggesting that economic explanations, such as search
costs or wealth e®ects, are not a likely explanation. Second, we focus on behavioral expla-
nations. The psychology literature identi¯es several common heuristics individuals use to
choose among multi-attribute options. Focusing on the most prominent heuristics, we ¯t
a combined model to our data and establish the weights each age group allocates to each
1See, for example, Mittenberg, Seidenburg, O'Leary, and DiGiulio 1989, MacPherson, Phillips, and Della
Sala 2002, and Zelinski and Burnight 1997.
3decision-making strategy. We ¯nd decision-making heuristics di®er with age. Older subjects
tend to discard information on the relative importance of attributes, selecting options with
the largest number of attributes (Cole and Balasubramanian 1993, Johnson 1993, Zwahr,
Park, and Shifren 1999). This is akin to selecting a prescription drug plan based only on the
number of drugs each plan covers, and not the likelihood that each will be needed. We design
a new experiment as an out-of-sample test of the heuristics estimates. We test and verify the
heuristics estimates by designing a new experiment as an out-of-sample test.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment consists of a series of computerized choice tasks. In every task, there are a
number of distinct states that could each occur with a known probability. Subjects choose
among a set of options where an option is de¯ned as a collection of states. Each task is
represented in a tabular form.2 Figure 1 shows a screen shot of a sample task. The set
of states forms the rows of the table and is labeled \Cards" while options are represented
by columns and labeled alphabetically. Checkmarks in the Options column indicate all of
the states included in that option. The column labeled \Odds" shows the probability of a
particular state occurring, presented to subjects as the number of each card type in a deck
of 100 cards.
After a subject chooses an option, one state is selected at random. This is accomplished
by having subjects draw one card from 100 unmarked randomly shu²ed cards displayed on
the screen. Once a subject draws a card by clicking on it, the number on every card is
revealed. If the chosen option contains the selected state, a subject earns $1 for that round,
and earns $0 otherwise.
In the example in Figure 1, a subject who selects Option A would earn $1 if one of the
twenty four Card 1s, or one of the twenty one Card 3s, or one of the twelve Card 5s, or one
of the nine Card 6s were drawn. Option C is the optimal choice as its expected payment
of 0:71, found by summing the probabilities of covered states, is greater than the expected
payment of any other option (0:66, 0:50, and 0:62 for Options A, B, and D). Drawing one state
removes considerations of risk from the problem, allowing for straightforward comparisons
across subjects.
2Tables are relatively simple and a format often preferred by subjects (Agnew and Szykman 2005).
4Figure 1: Screen shot of a sample choice problem
13 options
States Distribution 4 options
6 10 PDF 1 PDF 2 A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Card 1f
Card 1
21f
15
2f
1 X X X X X X X X
Card 7 6 1 X X X X X X X X
Card 2f
Card 2
26f
10
38f
22 X X X X X
Card 8 16 16 X X X X X
Card 3 Card 3 12 1 X X X X X X X X
Card 4f
Card 4
24f
7
31f
12 X X X X X X X X X X
Card 9 17 19 X X X X X X X X X X
Card 5 Card 5 8 26 X X X X X X X
Card 6f
Card 6
9f
4
2f
1 X X X X X X X X
Card 10 5 1 X X X X X X X X
Table 1: Experimental treatments. The table shows the eight option, distribution, and state
combinations. Subjects see options A, B, C, and D, in 4 option tasks and options A through
M in 13 option tasks. The likelihood of cards being drawn is dictated by either probability
distribution PDF1 or PDF2. The 10 state tasks are derived by splitting some of the states in
the 6 state tasks. The probability of the original state is allocated among the new (sub)states
derived from it, and each (sub)state inherits the checkmark (or absence of a checkmark).
5Subjects are presented with eight choice tasks constituting a 2 £ 2 £ 2 within-subject
design. The ¯rst dimension is the number of options (four or thirteen), the second is the
probability distribution over states (PDF1 or PDF2), and the third is the number of states
(six or ten). The full design is shown in Table 1. The example in Figure 1 corresponds to the
4 option, 6 state, PDF1 problem (though options and states are presented in random order).
The number of options in a choice task was either four or thirteen, representing a more
than threefold increase across choice tasks. The distribution denoted PDF1 places more
equitable though not identical weights on states, whereas most of the probability mass of
PDF2 was concentrated on a few states. As a consequence, options under PDF1 have a
smaller variation in payo®s, while under PDF2 payo®s are more widely distributed. Decisions
under PDF2 may be easier for individuals who elect to focus on high-probability states and
discount lower probability events (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989). The two distributions
di®er as the choice set expands from four to thirteen options. In PDF1, the optimal option
does not change as new (suboptimal) options are added. Under PDF2, expansion of the choice
set provides a clearly superior alternative as the optimal option changes from an expected
payo® of 0.71 to 0.96. More options are not helpful under PDF1, by design, while PDF2
o®ers a signi¯cant chance for improvement.
The minimum number of states is set at six to ensure that thirteen su±ciently-varied
options could exist without including trivial options that covered either none or all of the
possible states. Ten state choice sets are formed from six-state ones by splitting some states
into multiple (sub)states. The probability of the new (sub)states totals that of the original
state. Further, any option containing the original state also contains all of the new (sub)states
while options not containing the original state contain none of the new (sub)states. Thus,
changing the number of states does not change the underlying structure of the choice set.
The order in which subjects saw the eight problems was randomized to control for order
e®ects. Subjects learned the results of each round before proceeding to the next one. They
were not informed of the state and option expansion relationships. The order of options
and states within each choice task was randomized, but relabeled to maintain an alpha-
betical/numerical ordering. Subjects completed the eight tasks after reading computerized
directions (see appendix) and a two-option, three-state problem that served to familiarize
subjects with the interface.
6Options States PDF
All 4 13 6 10 1 2
Optimality 40% 47% 34% 42% 39% 34% 46%
Near Optimality 65% 72% 58% 65% 65% 73% 57%
Table 2: Frequency of optimal choice
A total of 127 subjects participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited through
Vanderbilt University's eLab, a demographically diverse online panel of over 80,000 indi-
viduals interested in participating in online studies. Subjects were randomly selected for
invitations, strati¯ed by age and sex, with a response rate exceeding 70%. The average age
was 50.7, with thirty ¯ve subjects under the age of 41, forty seven between 41 and 60 years
of age, and forty ¯ve older than 60. Males constituted 52% of our sample. In our sample, 12
subjects had only a high school degree, 58 had some college education but not a degree, 33
had a college degree, and 24 were graduate degree holders. The experiment took an average of
20 minutes with subjects receiving an average payment of $9.02, including a $3 participation
payment. Subjects were paid either by an online funds transfer or a mailed check.
3 Results
We begin our analysis with some general descriptive statistics of overall subject performance
(see Table 2). The optimal choice (with the highest expected payo®) was selected in 40% of
all choice tasks. We de¯ne an option as \nearly optimal" if its expected payo® is above 90%
of the optimal option's payo®. Such options were selected in two thirds of all choice tasks.
Subjects made better choices more often in the 4 option problems than in the 13 option
problems (see Table 2), selecting both optimal and nearly optimal options with signi¯cantly
greater frequency (Wilcoxon sign-rank p < 0:001).3 The performance in both cases is far
greater than would be expected if subjects were making choices randomly, suggesting that
the deterioration in performance is not simply an artifact of the design. Increasing the num-
ber of states from six to ten results in no signi¯cant change. Comparing the two probability
distributions, optimal choices were made in 46% of the choice tasks with the extreme dis-
tribution (PDF2) compared to 34% with the more uniform distribution (PDF1) (Wilcoxon
3For each subject, we compare the frequency of (nearly) optimal choice in the four 4 option problems to
the frequency of (nearly) optimal choice in the four 13 option problems.
7All
Age Sex
18{40 41{60 >60 Women Men
Optimality 40% 52% 40% 32% 41% 40%
Near Optimality 65% 72% 65% 60% 65% 65%
E±ciency 87% 90% 87% 84% 87% 87%
Normalized E±ciency 46% 60% 44% 36% 47% 49%
Subjects 127 35 47 45 58 69
Table 3: Choice performance by age
sign-rank p < 0:001). The opposite relationship holds for nearly optimal choices, though this
can be attributed to the design of the choice tasks. In the 13 option choice tasks, PDF2 of-
fered one superior option with an expected payo® of 0:96. No other option was close, meaning
that \optimal" and \nearly optimal" coincide. The presence of a clearly superior option led
to a greater likelihood of its selection.
Overall, the summary statistics suggest (perhaps not surprisingly) that subjects have a
harder time picking a needle out of a larger haystack than a smaller one. A key ¯nding of
this study is that decision making deteriorates with age. Table 3 reports performance by age
and sex. An optimal choice was made in 32% of the problems faced by subjects over the
age of 60 compared to 52% for those under 40 years of age. This pattern also persists across
cardinal measures of performance.4 E±ciency represents the expected payo® of the chosen
option divided by the expected payo® of the optimal option. Normalized e±ciency is de¯ned
similarly except that the average expected payo® of all available options is subtracted from
both the numerator and denominator. Thus, normalized e±ciency represents improvement
over selecting randomly, with 0% corresponding to the expected payo® from random selection,
and 100% corresponding to the optimal option. For all four measures, the di®erences between
the youngest and oldest age groups are highly signi¯cant (Mann Whitney p < 0:001) while
intermediate comparisons (youngest to middle and middle to oldest groups) are of mixed
signi¯cance.5 There are no di®erences in performance under any measure between women
and men (Mann Whitney p > 0:843 for all four measures).
4One must be cautious in making comparisons across choice tasks for a given subject as the set of options
di®ered, making errors more costly in some choice tasks than others. For example, selecting an option at
random would lead to a greater loss relative to the optimal option under PDF2 than PDF1. However, our
primary focus is on comparisons across subjects, for which cardinal measures of performance are valid.
5For Mann Whitney tests, each measure's average across all eight choice tasks was used for each subject.
8Main Experiment Only
High Stakes
and Main
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
13 Option Dummy ¡0.333*** ¡0.350*** ¡0.192** ¡0.289*** ¡0.069
(0.074) (0.076) (0.091) (0.105) (0.140)
10 State Dummy ¡0.084 ¡0.088 ¡0.089 ¡0.150 ¡0.164*
(0.071) (0.074) (0.074) (0.094) (0.097)
PDF2 Dummy 0.312*** 0.324*** 0.329*** 0.396*** 0.406***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.095) (0.095)
Age (Years) ¡0.014*** ¡0.010* ¡0.023*** ¡0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Male ¡0.133 ¡0.155 ¡0.226 ¡0.231
(0.143) (0.141) (0.145) (0.145)
Graduate Degree 0.576*** 0.621*** 0.529*** 0.540***
(0.167) (0.164) (0.174) (0.174)
13 Option Dummy ¡0.479*** ¡0.449**
£ Age > 60 Dummy (0.183) (0.216)
High Stakes Dummy ¡0.116 ¡0.112
(0.149) (0.150)
Constant ¡0.199** 0.491* 0.244 0.978*** 0.720**
(0.090) (0.277) (0.301) (0.259) (0.281)
N 1016 1016 1016 572 572
Log PseudoL ¡668:7 ¡645:7 ¡640:8 ¡345:3 ¡343:1
Robust standard errors, clustered by subject.
Parameter estimates (std. error) with *, **, and *** denoting signi¯cance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Table 4: Probit estimates for likelihood of optimal choice
Next, we estimate a probit model to investigate how decision characteristics and subject
demographics impact the selection of optimal options (see Table 4). In all speci¯cations (see
columns 1{3), we ¯nd that increasing the number of options from four to thirteen decreases
the likelihood of selecting the optimal option. Increasing the number of states from six to
ten has a negative, but insigni¯cant e®ect. This is most likely due to the relatively small
increase in their numbers across treatments or the way in which the increase in states was
implemented. However, subjects are much more likely to select the optimal option when
facing a problem with the extreme probability distribution of states (PDF2), than when
facing the distribution that places more equal weights on each state. PDF2 has half of the
states collectively accounting for only a 5% chance of getting paid. This may indicate that a
9Normalized
Optimality E±ciency E±ciency
Age ¡0.005*** ¡0.002*** ¡0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Male ¡0.050 -0.015 ¡0.058
(0.051) (0.019) (0.073)
Graduate Degree 0.213*** 0.082*** 0.314***
(0.067) (0.025) (0.095)
Constant 0.656*** 0.947*** 0.796***
(0.093) (0.034) (0.131)
R-squared 0.118 0.116 0.116
Parameter estimates (std. error) with *** denoting signi¯cance at 1%.
Male is not signi¯cant at 10%. Dependent variable is the average of the
measure across all choice tasks for each subject. N = 127.
Table 5: OLS estimates of e±ciency and demographics
reduction in the number of salient states improves performance.
Speci¯cation (1) includes only the main e®ects of our design. In speci¯cation (2), we
include demographic variables. Age has a negative and highly signi¯cant impact on the
likelihood an individual will select the optimal option. There is no signi¯cant di®erence
between men and women in the ability to select the optimal option. We ¯nd that postgraduate
education has a positive and signi¯cant impact.6
Motivated by the e®ect of age, we examine the interaction between options and age by
adding a dummy variable for our oldest age group facing 13 option problems. In speci¯cation
(3), the coe±cient for this variable is negative and highly signi¯cant. This indicates a second-
order e®ect of age. Beyond generally worse performance across all choice tasks, older subjects
are disproportionately a®ected by the addition of more options.
Our dependent variable, optimality, may be viewed as a crude measure of performance,
failing to account for di®erential costs of errors. Consequently, we explore cardinal perfor-
mance measures in Table 5. Since options di®er across tasks, it would be inappropriate to
compare these e±ciency measures across tasks, but it is a reasonable exercise across subjects.
We focus on demographic factors, and present OLS results for our two e±ciency measures.
Our dependent variable is the average e±ciency or average normalized e±ciency for each sub-
6We only present results with a postgraduate education dummy as inclusion of `some college education' and
`college degree' dummies produce similar results with neither signi¯cant. A Wald test for the equality of the
two dummies indicates that they are jointly equal to zero (p = 0:258). A Wald test that all three education
dummies are jointly equal to zero indicates the null hypothesis of joint equality is rejected (p = 0:003).
10ject across all eight choice tasks. For comparison, we also present OLS results for optimality,
where the dependent variable is the percentage of choice tasks in which a subject selected the
optimal option. All measures again show no e®ect for sex and a signi¯cant positive e®ect for
postgraduate education. For all measures, we observe a signi¯cant negative e®ect for age.
We examine two possible explanations for the di®erences in behavior across age groups.
The ¯rst explanation, grounded in economic motives, is that older subjects may be wealthier
on average, and thus may be less sensitive to the incentives provided in the experiment. A
second explanation is that either cognitive ability or the problem-solving approach change
with age. We consider each of these in turn.
4 High Stakes
To investigate the role of wealth e®ects and evaluate if performance improves with remuner-
ation, we conducted an additional set of experiments. We employed a fractional factorial
design, selecting four of the eight original choice tasks with stakes ten times those used in
the main experiment.7 Subjects were paid $10 per round if their selected option covered the
realized state. Subjects also received a $3 participation payment as in the original experi-
ment. Selecting from the same set of choice tasks as our main experiment keeps the di±culty
of the problem constant while signi¯cantly increasing the costs of decision errors. Thus,
explanations rooted in wealth e®ects would predict an improvement in decision making.
A total of 63 new subjects were recruited for the high stakes experiment, with thirty two
under the age of 40 and thirty one over the age of 60 with a desire to contrast the oldest
with the youngest subjects. Subjects took an average of 13 minutes for the entire experiment
and earned an average of $28.50. Higher stakes did encourage subjects to invest more time
in each decision. Subjects took an average of 59 seconds for making each decision, measured
from the time it was presented until a choice was con¯rmed. This is 22% longer than in the
lower stakes experiment (Mann Whitney p = 0:028).8 However, despite spending more time
choosing, subjects generally did not make better choices.
7The selected rounds were (listed as options, states, PDF): (4,6,1), (13,6,2), (13,10,1), and (4,10,2).
8The salience of stakes is arguably dictated not by overall earnings, but by the potential improvement in
payo®s from better decision making. The expected di®erence in earnings between a subject who selects the
worst option in each choice task and one who selects the best option is $18. Given 59 seconds, on average, for
each of the four choice tasks, this equates to an hourly wage of $275.
11High Stakes Experiment
Main Experiment
(Corresponding Choice Tasks)
18{40 >60 18{40 >60
Optimality 57% 21% 56% 32%
Near Optimality 76% 44% 73% 59%
Relative E±ciency 90% 77% 90% 84%
Normalized E±ciency 62% 13% 61% 38%
Subjects 32 31 35 45
Table 6: High stakes experiment summary statistics
Summary statistics for the high stakes experiment and the four corresponding choice
tasks in the main experiment are presented in Table 6. Increasing stakes has no impact on
the younger age group under any of the four performance measures (Mann Whitney p > 0:504
for each measure). For the older age group, performance actually declines with higher stakes,
though signi¯cance varies by measure (Mann Whitney p-values between 0:028 and 0:089).
We pool the low-stakes and high-stakes data in our probit speci¯cation, introducing a
dummy variable for the high stakes treatment. We present two speci¯cations in the last
two columns of Table 4.9 Age and graduate education again are highly signi¯cant. The
magnitude of the age variable increases markedly from the low-stakes experiment, in line with
our summary statistics showing even greater di®erences in performance across age groups. In
both speci¯cations, the coe±cient on the high stakes dummy is negative but not signi¯cant
(p > :438 for both speci¯cations). These results suggest that performance does not improve
in the high stakes experiment.
5 Heuristics
Individuals may use simple rules for decision making when faced with complex decisions.
Such heuristics reduce cognitive requirements by focusing the decision-maker on the most
promising strategies, albeit imperfectly (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In this section we
estimate the degree to which subjects use four common decision rules: payo® evaluation,
tallying, lexicographic ordering, and elimination of dominated options.
9We also replicated our analysis of Table 4 and Table 5 using only high stakes data. We found patterns
of signi¯cance identical to those in the main experiment. Additionally, since the high stakes experiment had
four rounds while the main experiment had eight, it is possible that the main experiment allowed for more
learning. To check this, we ran the analysis in Table 4 columns (4) and (5) using corresponding choice tasks
from the main experiment only when they occurred in the ¯rst four rounds. This does not change our ¯ndings.
12We posit a utility function, u, which is a linear weighting of the relevant option charac-
teristics for the four heuristics considered:
ui;o = ¯Xo + "i;o
where i and o denote an individual and a speci¯c option. Xo is a vector of option char-
acteristics, ¯ is the vector of weights placed on each characteristic, and " is some random
component.
For each option, Xo is de¯ned along four dimensions, all scaled between 0 and 1. First
is the option's payo®, which controls for optimal decision-making. It is the probability of
payment associated with each option. Second is the tallying heuristic which treats all states
as if they were of equal likelihood, discarding probability information (Dawes 1979). This
would favor options that cover the most attributes. It is measured as the percentage of
states covered by the option. Third is the lexicographic heuristic which favors options that
cover the most probable state (Keeney and Rai®a 1993, Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). If
this does not lead to a unique choice, the second most probable state is used, and so on.
This is measured as the percentage of states that are consecutively covered by an option after
ranking states by associated probabilities from largest to smallest. Fourth is the undominated
heuristic which focuses on eliminating the least desirable options (Montgomery 1983, Hogarth
and Karelaia 2005). In its simplest form, it selects only from options that do not consist of a
strict subset of the states included in another option. This heuristic allows for evaluation of
choices even when the utility of each attribute (or subjective probability of each state) is not
known (Aksoy, Cooil, and Lurie 2008). This measure equals one if the set of states included
in the option is not a subset of states included in another option and zero otherwise.
For example, consider the choice set presented in Figure 1. Our four measures for Option
A are 0:66 for payo®s (summing over covered states), 0:67 for tallying (four of six states), 0
for lexicographic order (most probable state is not covered) and 1:0 for undominated. For
Option D, the four measures are 0:62 for payo®s, 0:50 for tallying, 0:33 for lexicographic order
(two most probable states), and 1:0 for undominated.
An individual is assumed to select the option that maximizes utility from options available
in choice set C : ui;o ¸ ui;o0; 8o0 2 C. If " is distributed (type 1) extreme value, the probability
of selecting option o 2 C is given by
13All 18{40 41{60 >60
Payo® 3.469*** 4.144*** 3.767*** 2.851***
(0.313) (0.691) (0.530) (0.481)
Tallying 4.843*** 3.325** 5.115*** 5.564***
(0.576) (1.116) (0.929) (0.988)
Lexicographic 1.869*** 2.661*** 1.612*** 1.455***
(0.273) (0.554) (0.436) (0.468)
Undominated 0.277 0.888** 0.238 ¡0.026
(0.188) (0.419) (0.312) (0.297)
Observations 1016 280 376 360
LogL ¡1729 ¡429 ¡639 ¡645
Parameter estimates (std. error) with **, *** denoting signi¯cance at 5% and 1%.
Unstarred parameters are not signi¯cant at 10%.
Table 7: Estimates of decision-making rules
pC(o) =
e¯Xo
P
o02C e¯Xo0
This yields McFadden's conditional logit model (1974). We estimate the maximum likelihood
parameters, with standard errors adjusted for within-subject correlation (Wooldridge 2002).
Results are reported in Table 7 for the sample as a whole and by age group.10
There are a number of di®erences across age groups. Subjects aged 40 and younger
give the most weight to payo® maximization. They are also the only group that gives any
signi¯cant weight to an option being undominated. As age increases, the reliance upon payo®
decreases while the use of tallying increases. The youngest group places more emphasis on
the lexicographic properties of an option than any other age group. This heuristic performs
quite well in a variety of decision environments (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). For
subjects over 60 years of age, the focus is primarily on the number of covered states. This
is an optimal heuristic only when states are equally likely. For a person over 60, having an
additional state covered in a six-state problem is roughly equivalent to an extra 33% chance
of getting paid (5:564 £ 1=6 ¼ 2:851 £ 1=3).
In a series of experiments, Kovalchik et al. (2005) found little di®erence in decision
making between older and younger subjects. Kovalchik et al. conclude that \a widely held
notion, even among decision researchers, that decision making faculties decline with aging" is
unfounded (p. 90). In contrast, we note a signi¯cantly lower likelihood of selecting the optimal
10As the logistic choice model cannot identify each parameter and the variance of the distribution, parameters
should be interpreted as ¯=¾, complicating intuitive comparisons across age groups.
14option with age. These seemingly con°icting ¯ndings may suggest that aging has a di®erential
e®ect on various types of decisions. Older individuals appear more often to use heuristic
approaches (Johnson 1990) and use di®erent heuristics than younger subjects. For example,
older individuals are more likely to overweight low probability events and underweight high
probability events (Peters et al. 2007), consistent with the tallying heuristic. Thus, it is
quite possible that age does not diminish our faculties, but does change the decision-making
approach. The set of experiments used by Kovalchik et al. (2005) di®ers substantively from
our experiment. Hence, the age di®erences that we identify in the use of heuristics likely play
no role in their experiments.
It is reasonable to ask how robust these estimates are and if they predict subject behavior
in a di®erent set of choice tasks. To determine this, we conducted additional experiments
with a new set of subjects and di®erent choices tasks.
5.1 Out-of-Sample Experiment
A total of 66 new subjects (34 under the age of forty and 32 over the age of sixty) participated
in the out-of-sample experiment. Each choice task involved 6 options and 10 states. The
experiment involved four distinct tasks, each of which appeared twice, plus a practice task
as in the main experiments. Subjects did not know that tasks would be repeated and did
not know that the order of tasks, states, and options were randomized. As in the main
experiment, subjects were paid $1 if the selected option contained the randomly drawn state
plus a $3 participation payment.
In addition to validating the estimates, our goal is to see if the employed heuristics allow
choices to be manipulated. In this experiment, subjects were presented with substantially
more variability in option payo®s than in the original experiment. In some cases, the best
option had an expected payment of almost twice that of the next best alternative. The four
choice tasks are shown in Table 8. Options are presented in order of expected payo®s and
states are presented in order of probability. Subjects, of course, saw options and states in
random order, and were not provided the expected payo®. The table also shows both the
predicted probabilities for each age group based on our estimated heuristics in Table 7, and
the actual frequencies with which each option was chosen.11
11We also compared the observed and predicted choice frequencies separately for the ¯rst and second time
a subject saw each choice task. Qualitatively, there are no di®erences in results. Subjects are fairly consistent
on a given choice task.
15State PDF
Options
A B C D E F
1 32 X X
2 30 X X
3 16 X X
4 7 X X
5 6 X X X
6 3 X
7 3 X X X
8 1 X X
9 1 X X
10 1 X X X
Expected
78 45 42 18 14 10 Payo®:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .61 .26 .08 .02 .02 .01
Older: .26 .60 .07 .03 .03 .02
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .72 .24 .01 .01 .01 .00
Older: .34 .50 .05 .08 .00 .03
(a) Choice Task I
State PDF
Options
A B C D E F
1 19 X
2 19 X
3 18 X X
4 14 X
5 13 X X
6 9 X X X X
7 5 X X X
8 1 X X X X
9 1 X X X X X
10 1 X X X X X
Expected
56 30 25 26 25 17 Payo®:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .50 .21 .13 .05 .09 .04
Older: .18 .30 .15 .15 .09 .12
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .69 .04 .07 .09 .06 .04
Older: .42 .34 .06 .05 .08 .05
(b) Choice Task II
State PDF Options
A B C D E F
1 31 X X X
2 17 X X X X
3 12 X X X X X
4 10 X X X
5 9 X X X
6 8 X X X
7 6 X X X X
8 4 X X X X X
9 2 X X X X X
10 1 X X X
Expected 74 66 65 52 51 51
Payo®:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .31 .18 .18 .11 .11 .11
Older: .16 .17 .16 .17 .17 .17
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .63 .06 .06 .07 .06 .12
Older: .31 .11 .11 .14 .16 .17
(c) Choice Task III
State PDF Options
A B C D E F
1 13 X X X
2 12 X X X X
3 11 X X X X X X
4 11 X X
5 11 X X X X
6 10 X X
7 10 X X X X
8 9 X X X
9 9 X
10 4 X X X
Expected 87 77 46 38 41 38
Payo®:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .35 .59 .03 .00 .01 .01
Older: .60 .35 .02 .01 .01 .01
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .88 .06 .03 .00 .01 .01
Older: .67 .11 .08 .03 .06 .05
(d) Choice Task IV
Table 8: Out-of-sample experiments.
Predicted selection probabilities are derived from estimates in Table 7.
16In the ¯rst task, Option A covers only three states, but these states are the most probable
ones. Option B is the only option to cover more than three states. We aimed to exploit
the di®erence between a lexicographic heuristic and a tallying one, which simply counts
the checkmarks. We predicted younger subjects would select the optimal option with a
61% probability, while older subjects would select Option B with a 60% probability. In the
experiment, both groups selected the optimal option with greater frequency than the heuristic
model predicts. This is not wholly unexpected, given the large di®erence in payo®s and the
fact that the estimates are derived from an experiment with di®erent sizes of choice sets.
Nevertheless, the estimated heuristics predict the modal choice for each age group. Further,
younger subjects received a much higher expected payo®, de¯ned as the sum of each option's
expected payo® times its frequency of selection. Average payo® for younger subjects was 0.68
versus 0.53 for older subjects (Mann Whitney p < 0:001).
The second task is similar to the ¯rst, but makes the PDF slightly more uniform and
adds more check marks to Options C through F. Average payo® for younger subjects was
0.46 versus 0.39 for older subjects (Mann Whitney p = 0:063). The third task attempted
to induce indi®erence among all options for the older age group. Options have substantially
closer payo®s than in previous choice tasks and inferior options cover more states. Looking at
actual frequencies suggests the optimal was again chosen more frequently than estimated, but
signi¯cant errors among older subjects were observed. Average payo® for younger subjects
was 0.67 versus 0.62 for older subjects (Mann Whitney p = 0:006).
The fourth task attempts to coax the younger group into selecting a suboptimal option
while leading older subjects to the optimal choice. A fairly extreme choice task needs to
be created for the predicted performance of the older subjects to be greater than that of
the younger subjects. Here, the tallying heuristic does well, as the option with most states
covered is optimal. The lexicographic heuristic, if applied literally, would prefer Option B.
Ultimately, younger subjects did not do worse than older subjects and in fact earned a higher
expected payo® (.84 compared to .76, Mann Whitney p = 0:005). This suggests younger
subjects adjust their strategy in the new experiment and are not easy to exploit. Conversely,
while older subjects did better than predicted, the heuristics estimation provides an accurate
qualitative description of their decision-making. The older group is more prone to suboptimal
decision-making and is more easily exploited by manipulating the presentation of the decision.
17Overall, the results show that the estimated heuristics parameters predict behavior well in
out-of-sample problems.
6 Conclusion
Individuals frequently encounter complex environments in which they have to make a decision.
When selecting health insurance or retirement plans, individuals often have to consider and
compare multiple options, each with multiple attributes. Similar challenges arise in settings
ranging from selecting a cell phone plan to purchasing a car. Previous research has found
that when faced with a large number of options, individuals may be less likely to make a
choice or more likely to self report being dissatis¯ed with the choice they made. We use
laboratory experiments to assess if individuals are making optimal decisions when options
can be objectively evaluated.
We ¯nd that subjects are less likely to select optimal options from larger choice sets than
from smaller ones. Our results indicate that performance signi¯cantly decreases with age,
but does not vary with sex. Further, older subjects su®er a greater performance reduction
due to an increase in the number of options. This result was replicated with another set
of subjects for whom the monetary incentives for making an optimal choice were increased
tenfold. The di®erences in decision making across age appear to be caused by the use of
di®erent heuristics. Older subjects tend simply to count the number of positive attributes
provided by each option. These tendencies were found to be robust when another set of
subjects faced a distinct set of options in a third experiment.
One may be tempted to conclude that individuals are better o® with fewer options, and
argue for arti¯cially limiting choice as Frank and Newhouse (2007) do. Our ¯ndings should
not be interpreted as supporting this view. When the expanded choice set includes an option
vastly superior to any option available with fewer choices, average e±ciency may increase
even if fewer individuals select the optimal option. A smaller share of a larger pie can be
better than a larger share of a smaller pie. While our results suggest that the share will
decrease as the number of options increases, the change in the size of the pie depends on the
speci¯c options that are available in the two situations. In many naturally occurring settings,
it is not possible to know if new options are better than those that previously existed. Who
18knows a priori if a new °avor of jelly will be preferred to existing °avors? Even if the creation
of this °avor causes some not to buy jelly, this loss could be o®set by the gain others receive
from a new preferred option.
Instead, our results serve as a reminder that one should be aware of behavioral biases
while encouraging choice. The theory of asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al. 2003), for
example, prescribes respecting consumer sovereignty by making all choices available, but pre-
senting them in a fashion that encourages optimal decisions among those using less desirable
heuristics. Subjects who rely on the tallying heuristic are likely to select the option that
covers the most states, independent of each state's relative probability. Providing compar-
isons in which the probabilities of states are more or less similar allows the tallying heuristic
to perform well. This would be a boon to those over 60 who are more likely to use the
tallying heuristic, according to our results. Decision tools that refocus decision makers on
the likelihood of states might also combat the suboptimality of the tallying heuristic. Other
decision tools may actually encourage bad choices. For example, a common way of presenting
Medicare Part D plan options is by listing the total number of drugs covered by each plan.
This may encourage sub-optimal decision making by reinforcing a tendency to ignore the
likelihood of a state occurring.
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Screen Image 3 – Sample Round  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Screen Image 4 – Cards: Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Screen Image 5 – Cards: Determining Payment for Decision Round  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 